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The relationship between the organizational functions of governance and 
management is one of the most crucial for the effectiveness of the corporation. 
Different countries have developed different ways of organizing the governing 
function in order to protect the interests of the owners, while leaving managers 
enough freedom to take managerial decisions and actions. Many symptoms show 
a decrease in the role of governance and of owners. Authors  discuss reasons for 
that decline and suggest solutions to bring back the power of owners. In this 
article the author defines governance and management and their relationship, 
compares problems of the two basic models of governance and summarizes the 
solutions. He discusses the improvements of the present models of governance, 
and then speculates on possible future developments in two directions: 




                                                
Through the history of mankind, we can trace the endeavours of people to 
be efficient and effective in order to increase the probability and the quality of 
survival. For the same reason,  enterprises have been established as basic units 
of economic activities. First, by instinct and then by logic, it has been found that 
enterprises, although not being perfect, assure the desired economic results in 
the best possible way. Due to the same reason, enterprises have changed and 
different types have been developed. 
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The socio-economic system forces enterprises to behave in a rational way. 
It seems that the ownership-based (marketing) system, where enterprises face 
competition and follow the principle of profitability, assures the most effective 
behaviour of enterprises and, through this, social welfare. The effectiveness of 
enterprises depends on decision-making and on the execution of decisions. With 
the development of economy, the decisions within companies became most 
important, above all, the decisions on the enterprise as a whole. These decisions 
are made by owners themselves to protect their own interests. Through time, 
decisions on the enterprise became very complex. The number of owners has 
been increasing. Owners-shareholders have started to employ professionals 
called managers to manage their companies. The once unified function of 
governance (and management) has been divided into two organizational 
functions: governance, making decisions to protect owners’ interests, and 
management, coordinating business activities in a most efficient way while 
striving to attain goals and execute policies set by governance. The problem 
which arose appeared to be the following: if managers are given too much 
autonomy, they can utilize their knowledge and experience to its full extent. 
However, there exists a potential danger of not acting in favour of the owners. 
In contrast, if managers are controlled too tightly by owners or their 
representatives, they can not fully utilize their knowledge and experience. The 
question faced then becomes the following: how to achieve the best possible 
managerial decisions while protecting the interests of the owners.      
 
Different solutions have been found in different countries and different 
enterprises. Basically, two sets of answers to the above question have been 
developed throughout history: Anglo-American and German. Much discussion 
on the governance-management issue nowadays shows the importance of this 
most crucial relationship for the success and development of companies. 
Most of the discussion is on the  decision-making issues, which mainly results 
in suggestions to improve the present system. Less discussion is held on the 
socio-economic part of the governance-management relationship, which 
could explain more profound changes due to the changing socio-economic 
environment. 
 
It is my intention to discuss the mentioned relationship, above all, the 
governance side of the relationship. There will be more emphasis on a 
comparison between two different models of governance and on socio-
economic issues, and I will speculate about future development. It is my 
purpose to add clarification to the governance-management relationship and to 
look for possible directions of future development. 
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The fact is that governance has not been much discussed in the past. As 
Cadbury (Cadbury, 1999, p. 12) points out looking at trends in corporate 
governance, “only a few years ago a conference of this kind would have been 
inconceivable; there would have been neither providers of papers nor 
participants”. According to him, the emergence of global markets and pressure 
for board accountability and performance are the driving forces behind today’s 
worldwide interest in governance. Agreeing with his statement, still, in my 
opinion, the main reason for the interest in governance is due to the cognition of 
the decreasing role of owners. The question of whether to bring back the power 
to owners or to admit that the concept of ownership has changed and search for 
new ways of governance can be raised. For that reason, it is important to discuss 
the socio-economic basis of governance and not only the technical and process 
side of it.  
 
2. DEVELOPMENT AND THE DEFINITION OF GOVERNANCE 
AND MANAGEMENT  
 
It is quite useful for the understanding of complex subjects to simplify 
them by looking only at those characteristics that are connected to the purpose 
of the study. That is the way a good theory approaches the  practice and 
explains phenomena of the subject in a clear way, making a good theory the 
best practice. 
 
At the beginning of their development, most subjects are quite simple. 
Their basic goals and relationships can be seen clearly. Then, subjects become 
more complex. It becomes very difficult to explain different phenomena. The 
symptoms are seen, but reasons to explain them are forgotten and have to be 
rediscovered. To understand today’s state, it is useful to purposefully simplify 
and learn from history. However, we have to be aware of qualitative changes as 
we transform the findings from simple situations to more complex ones. We can 
also learn by comparing different solutions existing at the same time in order to 
find out what is common to all solutions and by  trying to observe the 
differences and understand and  explain reasons for them. 
 
Let us recall that a conscious working process consists of three phases: 
thinking ahead upon the desired result and the process of achieving it, or 
planning; executing the planned, or execution; and establishing the will for 
execution according to plan, or controlling. The planning and controlling 
phases ensure the rationality of the (execution) process, whereas the execution 
phase results in a product or service. Let us assume that the described process is 
conducted by an individual. He or she produces a product using his or her tools 
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or equipment. The individual  works with his own means of production by 
planning, executing, and controlling. Decisions are governed by efficiency due 
to scarce resources and unlimited needs. 
 
By increasing business, the individual might employ more workers. By 
being the owner of the means of production, he or she has the right to decide 
upon property. However, the owner does not influence the property by working 
himself. He or she  governs and manages the work of others. The once united 
function is now split into the governing-managerial function and execution of 
the work. For economic and other reasons, companies are growing. The 
coordination of more and more employees is becoming more complex. It has to 
be conducted by professionals, by managers. The other factor that complicates 
owners’ decisions is the increasing number of owners. Three basic 
organizational functions develop within today’s corporation: governance, 
management, and execution. 
 
Governance is the organizational function  (Lipovec, 1987, p. 52)  
a)  which is determined by the individual socio-economic system, 
b)  which is the source of authority in the enterprise, 
c)  which develops dynamically in the process of determining goals, policy and      
 other important decisions, 
d)  to represent, to preserve and to develop the interests of the owners. 
 
The first and the last part of the above definition is the socio-economic 
part and explains that enterprise is influenced by a socio-economic system. By 
following the system, enterprises maintain the system. The relationship between 
governance and economy is dual. The second part is the organizational part of 
the definition. It explains that, because of ownership, governance is the ultimate 
power and source of legal positional power or authority within the enterprise. 
This relationship is also two sided. The employees accept this authority. The 
third part of the definition determines the process of governance, saying that 
important decisions start within the function of governance and continue in the 
managerial process. 
 
The same author defines management as an organizational function  
(Lipovec, 1987, p. 137) 
a)  which enables - because of the technical division of labor - divided 
operations to remain part of the unified business process, 
b) which receives its duties and authority from governance as its executive and                                               
confidential body, and 
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c)  which executes its duties through others by the process of planning (business 
and organization), actuating (organization), and controlling (business and 
organization). 
 
The first part of the definition is purely technical. The second part is socio-
economic, showing the relationship between governance and management. The 
third part (which I adapted) explains the managerial process.  
 
Most of the decisions on the enterprise are initiated by the governing 
function and are continued by the managerial function. It is reasonable to talk 
about a uniform governing-managerial process. For the practical reason, 
above all, to settle the responsibility of governance on one side and of 
management on the other, it is necessary to somehow determine the 
demarcation line between both functions. I would like to emphasize that the 
problem of the distinction between governance and management lies basically 
in the nature of the (once uniform) governing-managerial process. The 
demarcation line is formally determined either by law and/or by the owners and 
other stakeholders, most often by both. It can be understood from the definition 
of governance and of management that demarcation is usually explained in a 
socio-economic, organizational and decision-making sense. 
 
3.  COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND  
 GERMAN SYSTEMS OF GOVERNANCE  
 
3.1. A brief comparison between both systems of governance  
 
As I have already mentioned, different countries have developed different 
systems or models of the governing function within enterprises. The differences 
between the Anglo-American and German system are frequently discussed. 
Among other reasons, the difference is due to history. According to Potthof 
(Potthof, 1996, pp. 257-258), banks played an important role in the German 
economy at the beginning of the 19th century. They looked for good investments 
but were not much interested in managing enterprises. They simply tried to 
transform the short run assets into long run ones and to supervise the business 
results but not to manage enterprises. In contrast, in England, and above all 
in the US, capital was scarce. Risk-taking individuals, and not bankers were 
interested in profits. They did not only supervise, but they also managed 
companies. Their role of directing companies was more active than in Germany 
where it was limited to a supervising function only. In the US, the governing 
and managerial roles have been much more often conducted jointly by the same 
persons, thus treated by many authors as one function. 
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One of the consequences of the different development (and different 
culture) is that in the US, the roles of different bodies are decided upon at a 
higher degree by owners themselves, whereas in Germany, they are more or less 
determined by law. For that reason, managers are more responsible to owners in 
the US and more to the law in Germany. However, there are more differences 
between both systems. Let us discuss only some of them. 
 
In the Anglo-American model, there are two governing bodies: the 
shareholders’ meeting and the Board of Directors. In the German model, there 
are three governing bodies: the shareholders’ assembly, the supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and the managerial board (Vorstand). The shareholders’ meeting 
and assembly are rarely emphasized, or sometimes not even mentioned due to 
their formal and less important role. Governance in the Anglo-American model 
is conducted entirely by the Board of Directors (one tier system). In the German 
model, governance is conducted by two bodies: the supervisory and the 
managerial boards. In the two tier or dual system, the supervision and the 
direction are assigned to two separate bodies. The managerial board, however, 
is not only a governing body but also the highest managerial body. The board of 
directors also probably conducts some managerial role. 
 
Let us have a brief look at the decisions made by the mentioned bodies. 
According to Goold (Goold, 1996, pp. 572-575), the possible duties of 
governance in the Anglo-American system are: 
 reviewing business level strategies, 
 reviewing the corporate level strategy, 
 providing specialist advice, 
 reviewing the decision process, 
 providing a sounding board or a second opinion, 
 changing corporate management. 
 
Parker (Parker, 1990, pp. 35-43), as discussing the role of chairman of the 
board defines the basic roles of the board as corporate governance and direction, 
whereas the role of executive management is strategy development and 
implementation. Governance and direction include setting the strategy, style and 
standards. 
Pound (Pound, 1995, pp. 89-98) identifies the essential governance role as 
selecting, monitoring, evaluating, and sometimes removing managers. 
 
O’Neal and Thomas (O’Neal, Thomas, 1996, p. 314) determine the three 
basic functions of the Board:  
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 advising and counseling top management, 
 monitoring and controlling top management, 
 corporate strategy. 
 
Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1983, pp. 67-95) emphasizes the difference 
between functions of the board in law and in practice. As the control roles in 
practice, he pointed out, the Board is selecting the chief executive officer, 
exercising direct control during periods of crisis and reviewing managerial 
decisions and performance. The author also added service roles. 
 
From the above opinions and from opinions of other authors, it can be 
clearly seen that they all agree as to the supervisory function of governance. 
However, we have to make a distinction between control of business results as a 
consequence of decisions and control of decisions themselves. Control of 
decisions themselves means that major managerial decisions have to be at least 
approved by the Board. In this case, the Board directs, advises, counsels and 
even proposes major decisions. It is our conclusion that most authors agree that 
the role of the Board of Directors lies in controlling the business results and in 
controlling (accepting, influencing) major decisions. This second part of the 
Board’s involvement is not so clear. E.g. many authors discuss the role of 
boards in strategic planning. Many of them discuss three possible ways of 
involvement (Zahra, 1990, pp. 109-117).  First, the board has nothing to do with 
strategic planning. Second, the board makes suggestions and approves the 
strategic plan. Third, the board is fully involved in strategic planning and 
accepts the plan. 
 
The following properties of the German model of governance and 
management are characteristic today (Potthof, 1996,  p. 256): 
 “Vorstand” as the managerial body is held responsible for running business 
affairs; 
 “Vorstand” is a collective, colleagual body. The chairman has no right to 
make individual decisions; 
 “Aufsichtsrat” acts as a supervisory board having only the supervisory 
function. It is allowed to conduct some other tasks according to its 
discretion; 
 “Aufsichtsrat” can hire and fire “Vorstand”, 
 “Aufsichtsrat” can name different comittees; 
 “Aufsichtsrat” is informed through management; 
 Representatives of workers are also members of the supervisory board. 
Managers are not allowed to be members of the supervisory board. 
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Let us put our conclusion in a simplified manner. By the term governance 
(which, we emphasize again, can be very difficult to separate from the 
managerial process), the supervision of business results, the direction of the 
most important decisions (which can be regarded as strategic decisions), and the 
confirmation of these decisions can be understood. Although there is some 
flexibility and there are some exceptions, we can argue that in the Anglo-
American system, all mentioned decisions are taken by Boards of Directors. In 
the German model, only the supervision of business results is made by the  
supervisory board, whereas the other decisions are taken by a managerial board. 
Due to that distinction, the other differences between the two systems can be 
easily interpreted. 
 
The membership in Boards of Directors is two-fold: executive, or “inside” 
and non-executive, or “outside” directors. In the German supervisory board, 
managers cannot be members. In the Anglo-American system, the influence of 
owners through direction is higher. However, the supervision is not quite clear 
and very difficult to be established as independent. In the German system, the 
supervisory part can be stronger and more clear-cut. The role and responsibility 
of the Board of Directors is more important than in the case of “Aufsichtsrat”. 
In the German system, governance is settled mainly by law. In the Anglo-
American system, the role of the Board prevails. In the German model, the 
supervisory board can act through the appointment and dismissal of the 
“Vorstand” only. In Anglo-American system, it can also act by influencing 
major decisions. We can conclude that both systems are logical and in 
harmony within  themselves despite the fact that they are different.  
 
3.2. Major problems in governance  
 
Most authors are quite sceptical as to the role of  boards. Drucker (Drucker, 
1974, p. 728), discussing legal and other aspects of boards in different 
countries, came to the conclusion that they differ in everything except one issue: 
“They do not function”. He continues: “The decline of the board is a universal 
phenomenon of this century.  Perhaps nothing shows it as clearly as that the 
board, which, in law, is the governing organ of a corporation, was always the 
last group to hear of trouble in the great business catastrophes of this century.” 
In his essay on “The Bored Board” (Drucker, 1981, pp. 107-110), “the Board 
has become an impotent ceremonial and legal fiction. It certainly does not 
conduct the affairs of the enterprise”. Bavley (Bavley, 1986, pp. 20-26) quotes 
several different authors and empirical studies coming to the conclusion that 
“Boards of directors are surprisingly unimportant”, “most companies have 
turned boards into non-boards”, and “board meetings rarely go beyond 
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trivia” and similar conclusions. Mintzberg (Mintzberg, 1983, p.78), after 
pointing out that boards do not perform well, concluded that “when a board 
does indeed have control, its real power amounts to the capacity to dismiss and 
appoint the chief executive officer”. 
 
The above quotations and plenty of others confirm more or less 
unanimously not only that governing bodies are not functioning properly, but 
also that the main problem lies in the very small power of governance 
(shareholders and their representatives) to influence decisions of the enterprise. 
Reasons for such a situation can be seen from  suggestions proposed by authors 
to improve the governance. Most authors agree that managers (CEOs) are taking 
over the role of the board due to the following reasons: 
 the role of the chairman of the board and the role of the CEO are often 
integrated into one person which additionaly decreases the role of outside 
directors; 
 non executive directors are really selected by the chairman of the board; 
 non executive directors devote very little time to handling company affairs 
and are unable or unwilling to play a more active role. 
 
4. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENTS OF GOVERNANCE 
 
Before continuing our discussion, I have to clarify what I understand by 
stakeholders’ participation in corporate governance. Wheeler and Sillanpaa 
(Wheeler, Sillanpaa, 1998, pp. 201-210), like the other authors, define 
stakeholders as individuals or (social) units which both influence and  are 
influenced by the corporation. Authors often distinguish three groups of 
stakeholders. Customers, suppliers, banks and similar entities are regarded as 
one group. The second group consists of society and its representatives, like the 
state. The third group consists of employees. Their participation in governance 
means that they are taking major strategic decisions together with owners, 
supervising managerial decisions and participating in decisions on profit 
sharing. 
 
As a major reason for the involvement of stakeholders in governance, the 
authors discuss the increasing need for connection and cooperation between 
enterprises. The advocates of stakeholders’ participation quote the German 
(and/or Japanese) system of governance in which the stakeholders participate 
directly or indirectly through membership in governing bodies in governing 
decisions. They discuss their involvement in the preparation of strategies (e. g. 
Scholes, Cluterback, 1998, pp. 227-238); their role in the process of adding 
value (e. g. Freeman, Liedtka, 1997, pp. 286-296) and their role and 
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involvement in similar situations. Opponents of governance by stakeholders do 
agree with most of the statements on the importance of tight connections with 
stakeholders, but think that it can be achieved through managerial coordination 
and connections. 
 
Their arguments against involvement of stakeholders in the governance of 
enterprises are of an economic and organizational nature. 
 
For economic science, there is little doubt that in a society based on the 
ownership, governance is conducted by owners. Lipovec (Lipovec, 1987, pp. 
40-41) describes the social economy as composed of many subjects-enterprises. 
The bearer of the decisions within enterprises is determined by the socio-
economic system. He  endeavours to fulfil his own interests by governing his 
property. In such a (capitalistic) system based on ownership of production 
means, at least the governance is conducted by owners or their representatives. 
It is in their interest to achieve profit based on the invested assets. Anything else 
might undermine the basis of the system. 
 
Easterbrook and Fischel (Easterbrook, Fischel, 1991, pp. 195-200) argue 
that only owners have the right to govern. All the other stakeholders are paid for 
their endeavours (by getting salaries, interests, products, payments, etc.). The 
shareholders - the only remaining party - are the sole risk-takers. By 
maximizing profits they also increase the value of the corporation. Above all, 
because of  
risk-taking, they have the right to make governing decisions. Again, not all 
authors agree. Plender (Plender, 1998, pp. 211-217) argues that today’s 
institutional owners, because of their broad portfolio of investments, do not take 
more risk than other stakeholders. 
 
Organizational arguments against stakeholders’ governance are discussed 
by Argenti (Argenti, 1997, pp. 442-445). He maintains that the group of 
shareholders is homogeneous, each share being of the same value. It is quite 
obvious what they expect from investments. Third, the decision-making process 
is clear, following the principle of profitability. Managers can follow only the 
requirements of one stakeholder. Last but not least, the problem of assigning 
shares of  profit to different stakeholders would be very difficult. Let us add that 
the accounting system, information and decision systems are developed for 
shareholders’ governance. 
 
We can see that most authors agree about the increasing need of devoting 
more concern to different stakeholders. Processes of outsourcing, networking 
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and development of virtual organization, strategic alliances, clusters, and similar 
forms of integration are symptoms of great changes. Throughout history, 
enterprises met on the market, guided by the invisible hand (and visible 
economic policy). Effectiveness has been achieved through the social division 
of labour. Economists and economic science have studied these relationships 
among enterprises. The technical division of labour took place within 
enterprises. Through organizational processes and relationships between 
individuals and groups, which are studied by organizational science, efficiency 
and effectiveness are achieved. With the outsourcing process, the social division 
of labour increases. However, we can not say that market relationships of the 
old type continue. The competitive market forces are at least partially replaced 
by partnerships, agreements, and trust. The newly established relationships of a 
higher order are of an organizational nature, similar to those within 
corporations. 
 
The question of what these changes will bring to governance arises. There 
is no doubt that integration between units will be tighter and there will be more 
coordination in the short run and in the long run. I believe that this coordination 
will be a mutual one and not enforced by a supreme authority. The coordination 
within networks and among them has been made possible by the development 
of communication technology. I also think that the increased amount of 
relationships can be handled by management and I can see little reason to 
increase the role of stakeholders in governance. However, there might be, for 
other reasons, more “interlocked” ownership and directorates, more acquisitions 
and mergers, more cases of one company owning the other, or the opposite. 
Still, in these cases, governance will be based on ownership. 
 
In my opinion, the present involvement of employees as stakeholders in the 
German model will continue. I doubt that within the present concept of 
ownership the governing role of other stakeholders will develop. That might be 
the case if the role of ownership will change. However, in such a case, the 
system of stakeholders’ governance might become too complex and 
stakeholders’ involvement can be achieved in a more simple way by governance 
of employees, of collectives (in the name of society). 
 
4.3. Governance by employees or self-governance  
 
There are numerous signs  that the concept of ownership is changing. The 
ownership of production means is not important for the survival of people. 
Some authors, including Handy (Handy, 1997, pp. 26-28), argue that 
definitions of ownership (including ownership of corporations) are not 
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appropriate any more. They are “…an affront to natural justice because it 
gives inadequate recognition to the people who work in the corporation, and 
who are, increasingly, its principal assets.”   
 
Until this point, I have intentionally not made a distinction between 
employees and other stakeholders. As we can see from various articles, authors 
discuss the direct involvement of  employees and much less or not at all of other 
stakeholders in the governance. Blair (Blair, 1998, pp. 195-200) comes to the 
conclusion that due to socio-economic development, shareholders are no longer 
the only investors in  corporations. The employees, above all, those who have 
developed some specific knowledge or skills connected to the enterprise, are a 
kind of investor, too. She explains with the example that owners  invest in a 
new machine. Employees develop specific software. There should be a long-
term relationship established. The added value of the enterprise is the sum of 
both investments. Blair does not see any need to make the distinction. However, 
other authors, e.g. Easterbrook and Fischel (Easterbrook, Fischel, 1998, pp. 
195-200), suggest that all stakeholders’ services can be bought and only 
residual claimants-shareholders  should govern. It is also possible, though, that 
software owners rent the hardware and govern the corporation. Why should 
owners of hardware not get some interest and software owners get a salary and 
they both could take risks and then divide the surplus? 
 
Let us go a step further. Already in 1932, Berle and Mean (quoted by 
Clarke, 1998, pp. 182-194) argue that “the control of the great corporations 
should develop into a purely neutral technocracy, balancing a variety of claims 
by various groups in the community and assigning to each a portion of the 
income stream on the basis of public policy rather than private cupidity.” Grant 
(Grant, 1997, pp. 450-454) says that “if knowledge is the pre-eminent 
productive resource and most knowledge is created by and stored within 
individuals, then employees are the primary stakeholders”. Different 
stakeholders or beneficiares (Argenti, 1993, pp. 214-215) will govern for the 
social, moral good. 
 
In quite a different connection, Duncan and coauthors (Duncan, et al., 
1988, pp. 16-21), quoting Geneen, argue that in the measure of effectiveness of 
the enterprise, which is characteristic for each socio-economic system, the most 
scarce resource is in the denominator of the fraction. The goal of the scarce 
resource is in the numerator of that fraction. In the past industrial society the 
scarce production factor was the capital. To attract capital, a corporation has to 
make a profit. Profitability was the main goal of the corporation. However, 
Duncan and coauthors say that nowadays, in the postindustrial society, if it is to 
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be qualitatively different from the industrial one, corporations are supposed to 
follow a new measure of effectiveness. The critical production factor is 
becoming knowledge. People are the only bearers of creativity and innovation; 
nowadays they both are important for success. If profit attracted capital, is it the 
income or value-added attracting the knowledge? 
 
From the above quotations, we can conclude that ownership and its role is 
changing. That is in line with the accepted opinion that we are entering a new 
era of post-industrial society. The publicly held corporations have outlived their 
usefulness and are being eclipsed. According to Jensen (Jensen, 1989, pp. 61-
74), new organizations owned by large institutions and financed more by public 
debts than equity are emerging. Jensen argues that “these corporations are 
resolving the central weakness of the public corporation - the conflict between 
owners and managers over the control and use of corporate resources…”  It is 
not my intention to elaborate more on the issues connected with institutional 
owners. My purpose was just to illustrate another example regarding the 
revolutionary changes going on within corporations and their governance.  
 
Let us speculate (let us have a vision), that there exists only one 
institutional owner - society. Hence, companies have to behave in a socially 
responsible manner. Companies are parts of networks; relationships among 
them are based on trust, too.  Loans or equity are given to enterprises at certain 
“interests”. The society can not govern the companies. Collectives-employees 
govern the enterprises in the name of society to increase the income of the firm 
(after their social responsibility is fulfilled). Management conducts the 
coordination in favour of the collective and of the society. Employees-“citizens” 
are highly motivated, not by salaries and wages which are becoming hygienic 
factors, but by self-fulfillment and being useful to others, to the society. They 
themselves govern the company in the name of society and at the same time 
they execute part of the coordinated labor. Why should there not be, in line with 
all the other changes going on, also a change in governance? Should we not 
crown all our talks on empowerment, self-management, knowledge-based 
management, self-development motivation, social responsibility, and ethics, 
with self-governance? 
 
If all the other changes are mere cosmetics, the cosmetic changes in 
governance will take place. If there are, as we are convinced, revolutionary 
changes going on, what will happen to governance: will it be conducted by 
many stakeholders, or by employees themselves in the name of society, or will a 
third solution prevail? 
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5. CONCLUSION  
 
With the development of the economy and of corporations, the problem of 
the decreasing role of owners becomes obvious. In a society based on 
ownership of production means, this change is quite an important issue of 
concern. The reasons for the decreasing role of owners might be in the natural 
conflict between managers and governance or deeper, in the very change of the 
substance of ownership.  
 
There are at least three possible speculations about the future development 
of governance. The first one, which seems to be the most reasonable, at least 
from the short run perspective, and discussed by most authors, is the cosmetic 
or perhaps evolutionary changing of governance: bringing back the power to 
owners. Owners themselves or through their representatives govern their 
property.  
 
The second possible future is to bring stakeholders to play the same role 
as owners which might become quite complex. In this case, the concept of 
ownership is remaining the same, but the governing role is changing. The 
enterprises would be interwoven through relationships of governance to form a 
network of governance.  
 
The third speculation is that we neglect today’s role of ownership and, 
instead of profitability, follow social responsibility and ethics. Society hands 
over the corporation to the governance of employees which in turn pays a 
(competitive, agreed)  reasonable “contribution” to society. As the only 
remaining claimant, the employees will be motivated to increase the income. In 
this case, the meaning of ownership is changing and the governance remains 




1. Argenti, J.: Stakeholders: The Case Against, Long Range Planning, 30 (3), 1997, 
442-445. 
2. Argenti, J.: Your Organization: What is it for?, McGraw-Hill, London, 1993. 
3. Bavly, D.: What is the Board of Directors Good For?, Long Range Planning,            
19 (3), 1986, 20-26.  
4. Blair, M. M.: For Whom Should Corporations Be Run?: An Economic Rationale 
for Stakeholders Management, Long Range Planning,  31 (2), 1998, 195-200. 
5. Cadbury, Adrian: What are The Trends in Corporate Governance? How Will They 
Impact Your Company?, Long Range Planning, 32 (1), 1999, 12-19.   
 107 
Management, Vol. 5, 2000, 2, pp. 94-110 
R. Rozman: The organizational function of governance: development, problems... 
6. Campbell, A.: The Cost of Independent Chairman, Long Range Planning, 28 (6), 
1995, 107-108.  
7. Clarke, T.: The Stakeholder Corporation: A Business Philosophy for the 
Information Age, Long Range Planning, 31 (2), 1998, 182-194. 
8. Conger, J. A., D. Finegold, and E. E. Lawler III: Appraising Boardroom 
Performance, Harvard Business Review, January-February 1998, 137-148.  
9. Drucker, P.: Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices, Heinemann, London, 
1974. 
10. Drucker, P.: The Bored Board, in “Towards The Next Economics and Other 
Essays”, Heinemann, London , 1981.  
11. Duncan, J. W., P. M. Ginter, A. C. Ruchs and T. D. Jacob: Intrapreneurship and the 
Reinvention of Corporation, Business Horizons, 31 (3), 1988, 16-21. 
12. Easterbrook, F. H. and D. R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law, 
Harvard University Press, Harvard, 1991. 
13. Freeman, E. and J. Liedtka, Stakeholder Capitalism and the Value Change, Long 
Range Planning, 30 (3), 1997, 286-296. 
14. Garratt, B.: Developing Effective Directors and Building Dynamic Boards, Long 
Range Planning, 32 (1), 1999, 28-35. 
15. Goold, M.: The (Limited) Role of the Board, Long Range Planning, 29 (4), 1996, 
572-575.  
16. Grant, R. M.: The Knowledge-Based View of the Firm: Implications for 
Management Practice, Long Range Planning, 30 (3), 1997, 450-454. 
17. Handy, C.: The Citizen Corporation, Harvard Business Review, September-
October 1997, 26-28. 
18. Jensen, M. C.: Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harvard Business Review, 
September-October 1989, 61-74.  
19. Lipovec, F.: Razvita teorija organizacije, Gospodarski vestnik, Ljubljana, 1987. 
20. Mintzberg, H.: Power In and Around Organizations, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
Englewood-Cliffs, 1983. 
21. O’Neal, D. and H. Thomas, Developing the Strategic Board, Long Range Planning, 
29 (3), 1996, 314-327.  
22. Park, J. C.: Reengineering Boards of Directors, Business Horizons, 38 (2), 1995,  
63-69. 
23. Parker, H.: The Company Chairman - His Role and Responsibilities, Long Range 
Planning,  23 (4), 1990, 35-43.  
24. Plender, J.: Giving People a Stake in the Future, Long Range Planning, 31 (2), 
1998,  211-217.   
25. Potthof, E.: Board-System versus duales System der Unternehmungsverwaltung - 
Vor - und Nachteile, Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, 3/96, 1996,  
253-268. 
26. Pound, J.: The Promise of the Governed Corporation, Harvard Business Review, 
March-April 1995, 89-98. 
27. Redraw the Line Between the Board and the CEO, Harvard Business Review,   
March-April 1995, 153-165. 
 108 
Management, Vol. 5, 2000, 2, pp. 94-110 
R. Rozman: The organizational function of governance: development, problems... 
28. Roberts, J. and P. Stiles: The Relationship between Chairmen and Chief 
Executives: Competitive or Complementary Roles, Long Range Planning, 32 (1), 
1999, 36-48. 
29. Scholes, E. and D. Clutterback, Communication with Stakeholders: An Integrated 
Approach, Long Range Planning, 31 (2), 1998, 227-238.  
30. Schreib, H. P.: Reform des Aufsichtsrats aus der Sicht der Aktionaere, 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, 3/96, 1996, 285-291.  
31. Schulte, D.: Reform des Aufsichtsrats aus Arbeitsnehmersicht, 
Betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung und Praxis, 3/96, 1996, 292-305. 
32. Stiles, P.: The Future for Boards: Self-regulation or Legislation, Long Range 
Planning, 26 (2), 1993, 119-123.  
33. Wheeler, D. and M. Sillanpaa, Including the Stakeholders: the Business Case, Long 
Range Planning, 31 (2), 1998, 201-210. 
34. Zahra, S. A.: Increasing the Board’s Involvement in Strategy, Long Range 
Planning, 23 (6), 1990, 109-117. 
 109 
Management, Vol. 5, 2000, 2, pp. 94-110 
R. Rozman: The organizational function of governance: development, problems... 
 110 
 
ORGANIZACIJSKA FUNKCIJA VLASNIČKOG UPRAVLJANJA: RAZVOJ, 




Odnos između organizacijske funkcije vlasničkog upravljanja i managementa je jedan 
od ključnih čimbenika učinkovitosti korporacije. U različitim su se zemljama razvili 
različiti načini organiziranja vlasničkog upravljanja, s ciljem zaštite vlasničkih interesa, 
a da bi se istovremeno managerima ostavila dovoljan sloboda odlučivanja i akcije. 
Mnogi simptomi ukazuju na smanjenje značaja uloge vlasnika i vlasničkog upravljanja. 
Stoga se razmatraju razlozi tog smanjenja i predlažu moguća rješenja za vraćanje moći 
vlasnicima. U okviru rada se definiraju vlasničko upravljanje i management, kao i 
njihov međusobni odnos, uspoređuju problemi dva temeljna modela vlasničkog 
upravljanja i ukratko predstavljaju moguća rješenja ovog pitanja. Nadalje se razmatraju 
mogućnosti poboljšanja prezentiranih modela vlasničkog upravljanja, te predviđa 
njegov daljnji razvoj u jednom od dva smjera: prema vlasničkom upravljanju od strane 
zainteresiranih za poduzeće ili vlasničkom upravljanju od strane zaposlenih. 
